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For decades Armenian studies has been marginalized in Middle Eastern, Turkish, Iranian, and
Ottoman studies for political and ideological reasons.1 Ignorance and reluctance to understand the field also have contributed to this marginalization. Some scholars viewed the
field as an archaic one, remote from the above-mentioned fields. Whereas some only
thought of Armenian studies as part of Caucasian studies, others did not want to be associated with Armenian studies due to its research focus on the Armenian Genocide, concerned
that any such association might endanger their access to the Ottoman archives or be tainted
as advocating an “Armenian point of view.” However, in the past two decades the situation
has started to change, as a new generation of young scholars, few in number and mostly
based in the West (with a few in Turkey), have embarked on diverse research projects to
understand the history and the culture of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Iran,
and the Arab Middle East. Although these have only scratched the surface, they should be
welcomed as an honest approach to understanding the history and contribution of the
Armenians to the region that goes beyond the approach of “good Armenian, bad
Armenian” that was endemic to Ottoman and Turkish studies during the Cold War period.2
Although the new trend tends to concentrate on the 19th and early 20th centuries, it should
be considered a welcome step.
Armenians of the Middle East—representing diverse, complex, and stratified groups—have
left a plethora of primary sources pertaining not only to the history of their own communities, but also to the history of the region. It is time that Western and Eastern Armenian be
considered key languages in Ottoman, Iranian, and Middle Eastern studies.3 In addition, it
also is the appropriate time to consider these “area studies” as overlapping and intersecting
fields and not as clear fields demarcated by geographical or ethno-religious national boundaries. Similar to the recognition that identities are hybrid and fluid, I also would like to promote here the idea that these “area studies” are hybrid and cannot and should not be studied
in isolation. Armenians spread across different area studies and multiple disciplines can be
hugely illuminating in comparative and broader study and perspectives.
Despite these positive, albeit limited, developments, an important event took place in
September to November of 2020 that shook the faith of scholars of Armenian background
1
Bedross Der Matossian, “Contending Trends in the Armenian Historiography of the Late Ottoman Empire:
Inclusion vs. Exclusion,” New Perspectives on Turkey 53 (2015): 174–80.
2
“Good Armenians” was the characterization of Armenians loyal to the Ottoman state and the Turkish Republic;
“Bad Armenians” was the label given to the revolutionaries by the Turkish state.
3
More than one thousand periodicals were published in the region in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. For the list visit: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IiO6aBB9H55upxiT54kbB8IjMC9Yagip/view?fbclid=
IwAR15BB3GI7D3dCDtV1PaL0rBU6Fn5Tl0C7U3cdvFphwmCcSZtUlHFEqZC1Q (accessed 20 April 2022).
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about this seemingly encouraging progress. This event was the Second Nagorno-Karabagh
War, which lasted for forty-four days. In this short essay, I will provide a brief overview
of the history of the conflict and attempt to understand the ambivalence of scholars in
the field and their reluctance to take a stance on condemning the assault against the selfproclaimed Republic of Karabagh by Azerbaijani forces and their allies.
The history of Nagorno-Karabagh (Artsakh in Armenian) and its contested claim has been
a major source of contention not only in the historiography but among the Armenians and
the Azerbaijanis themselves, leading to two devastating wars that have taken the lives of
more than thirty-five thousand people. The history of the region is complex, and I do not
intend to delve into all the details. However, what is evident is that in the course of history
Armenians have always constituted a majority in the region, with strong historical ties.
The source of the recent conflict goes back to the beginning of the formation of the USSR,
which changed the geopolitical picture of the South Caucasus. On July 5, 1921, as part of his
imperial policy of “divide and conquer,” Joseph Stalin decided to assign Karabagh to Soviet
Azerbaijan as a semiautonomous region, defying the will of the majority of the population to
be integrated into the newly formed Soviet Republic of Armenia. Consequently, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was established within the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923. Armenians considered Stalin’s move unjust and demanded
redress. In the succeeding six decades, Armenians of the region suffered continuous discrimination, displacement, and economic underdevelopment by successive Azerbaijani governments. They insisted that their national rights had been trampled upon and that their
cultural and economic freedoms had been suppressed. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the
Armenians of Karabagh began to voice their discontent, once more demanding unification
with Armenia or Russia. For example, in 1963 Armenians of Karabagh sent a lengthy petition
signed by thousands of them to Nikita Khrushchev, the secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, complaining about the systematic maltreatment and discrimination that
they had been suffering at the hands of the Soviet Azerbaijani government. Similar to
this, in 1967 they sent another appeal to the government of Soviet Armenia and the
Central Committee of the Communist Party lamenting the Azerbaijani policies of impeding
the economic development of the region, forcing native Armenians to abandon their lands,
and relocating Azerbaijanis in their place. They argued that the only remedy to this situation
was to attach Karabagh to the Soviet Republic of Armenia.4
The situation changed with the decline of the Soviet Union in the second half of the
1980s. In 1988 a national movement for self-determination began in Karabagh, expressing
the clear will of the people to separate from the Azerbaijan SSR and to unite with the
Armenian SSR. Their demands were met by a series of pogroms that took place in
Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Baku that were orchestrated by the Azerbaijani government.
Subsequently, more than four hundred thousand Armenians who lived in Azerbaijan fled
to Armenia and elsewhere, and more than one hundred seventy thousand Azeris living in
Armenia fled to Azerbaijan. In addition, Communist led-Azerbaijan, backed by the Soviet
Army, attempted to force more than one hundred fifty thousand Armenians to leave Artsakh.
The regional government of Karabagh held a referendum in February 1988, and 80 percent of the people voted to secede from Azerbaijan and to join Armenia. The reluctance
of successive Azerbaijani governments to respect the will of the Armenians of Karabagh
for self-determination led to a bloody conflict which became known as the First Karabagh
War (1988–94).
In November 1991, Azerbaijan’s Supreme Soviet annulled the autonomous status of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). In response, the Armenians of Karabagh
again voted in a referendum on November 27, 1991; more than 99 percent of those voting
Ara Sanjian, “Irredentism at the Crossroads of Nationalism, Communism and Diverging Interpretations of the
Soviet Experience: The Armenian Diasporan Press on Mountainous Karabagh, 1923–1985,” E-SAS, 6 January 2022,
http://entriessas.com/articles/armenian-diaspora.
4
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supported the independence of Karabagh. The situation changed drastically when Azerbaijan
and Armenia each declared their independence in August and September, respectively.
Karabagh joined them on September 2, 1991, declaring the establishment of the Republic
of Nagorno-Karabagh.
The Armenians of the newly independent yet unrecognized republic, backed by the
Republic of Armenia, resisted the Azerbaijani onslaught which began in December 1991.
After a war that lasted for years and took the lives of more than thirty thousand people
from both sides, the Armenians of Karabakh emerged victorious.
In 1994, the Karabagh Defense Army captured seven districts surrounding the republic
with the aim of creating a buffer zone. Azerbaijanis who lived in the seven surrounding districts of Karabagh controlled by Armenians were driven out and became internally displaced
persons.
On May 12, 1994, a cease-fire agreement was achieved through Russian negotiations, putting an end to the first war. The period between 1994 and the breakout of the Second
Karabagh War on September 27, 2020 witnessed efforts by the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to resolve the conflict. However, sporadic
clashes between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis continued. The Minsk Group was created in 1992 with the aim of encouraging a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh.5 However, in the course the negotiations, it failed to produce a permanent solution to the conflict. Although the Azerbaijani side asked for the immediate
removal of Armenians from the seven districts and the return of Karabagh to Azerbaijani
control, the Armenian side insisted that the leadership of Karabagh should have a say in
its final status. Although there was some readiness to return the seven districts, they
stressed the fact that the independent status of Karabagh was nonnegotiable.
On September 27, 2020, in the midst of a devastating global pandemic, Azerbaijan, aided
by Turkey and jihadist militants from northern Syria, attacked the Republic of Karabagh. The
war lasted for forty-four days leading to the death of thousands of soldiers and a large number of civilians.6 One hundred and eighty-seven Armenian soldiers and twenty-one civilians
are still missing, and around thirty-eight POWs remain in captivity.7 The infrastructure of
the republic was destroyed and 80 percent of the Armenians of Artsakh became refugees
in the neighboring Republic of Armenia.
On November 9, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed a trilateral statement and several previously Armenian-controlled regions were handed over to Azerbaijan.
The Armenian side lost the war due to the military superiority of the Azerbaijani army,
which was backed by Turkey and equipped with the latest military technology, notably
UAVs (drones) supplied by Turkey and Israel. The war not only resulted in the death of thousands of Armenians protecting their homeland, but it also was a major blow to the cultural
heritage of Artsakh and to its infrastructure. On October 8, 2020, Azerbaijani forces launched
an assault on the 19th-century Holy Savior Ghazanchetsots Cathedral located in Shushi, the
cultural capital of Karabagh, causing significant damage. The cathedral is a masterpiece of
19th-century Armenian architecture and a landmark of Armenian cultural and religious
identity.8 According to a detailed January 2021 report by the Artsakh Human Rights

5
The Minsk Group is cochaired by France, Russia, and the United States; Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, “Mandate for the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Process, OECD, 23 March 1995, https://www.
osce.org/mg/70125.
6
“Armenian PM Says Almost 3,800 Soldiers Killed in War with Azerbaijan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
24 August 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenian-deaths-karabakh-war/31425644.html.
7
“187 Armenian Soldiers, 21 Civilians Missing since 2020 War; Mirzoyan Says 38 Remain POWs,” Asbarez, 21 March
2022, https://asbarez.com/187-armenian-soldiers-21-civilians-missing-since-2020-war-mirzoyan-says-38-remain-pows.
8
“Azerbaijan: Attack on Church Possible War Crime: Investigate and Hold Those Responsible to Account,” Human
Rights Watch, 16 December 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/16/azerbaijan-attack-church-possible-warcrime.
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Defender’s office, 161 churches and monasteries have come under Azerbaijani control.9
Vandalism or destruction of Armenian monuments has become the norm.10
During the war, Armenians around the globe launched a massive fundraising campaign
that helped 80 percent of the Armenian refugees who left the war zone in Karabagh find
a safe haven in Armenia. At the same time, with limited resources they tried to raise awareness in the international media about the plight of the Armenians of Karabagh. However,
they were shocked to witness the anti-Armenian rhetoric and pro-Azeri bias in the
Western media. The desire of the Armenians of Karabagh for self-determination is a fundamental principal of human rights, which they had been denied for decades and for which
they had paid a dear price. Whereas the West has backed regions such as Kosovo in asserting
its right to self-determination, it was reluctant to do so in the case of Karabagh. Although
Armenia has nothing to offer to Europe in terms of natural resources, Azerbaijan, led by
the authoritarian regime of President Ilham Aliyev (r. 2003–), has leveraged its energy
resources and soft power to silence the international community and the world press regarding its unprovoked war against the Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh.
It was noteworthy that over the course of the war the international academic community
remained mostly silent, despite the uproar of scholars with either Armenian descent or close
ties to the region. There seemed to be an ambivalence about what was happening in the
South Caucasus. As the war did not take place within the clear geographical parameters
of the Middle East, it seems that it did not deserve the attention of Middle Eastern scholars
either. However, the war was a turning point for Middle Eastern studies scholars with
Armenian backgrounds. Many of those scholars who have been committed and active
(often at professional or personal cost) in other just causes, ranging from solidarity with
the Palestinians to the Kurds of Turkey, suddenly found they had no reciprocity from
their activist communities. Even prominent Armenian Genocide scholars of Turkish descent
failed to raise their voices and condemn the war amid “fears of reprisal” from the Turkish
government, which was directly involved in the war. It seemed that dealing with dead
Armenians was safer than dealing with those who were under attack. In the midst of the
Karabagh war, the leadership of the Society for Armenian Studies (SAS), an affiliate of the
Middle East Studies Association (MESA), reached out to MESA’s Committee on Academic
Freedom (CAFMENA) asking it to issue a statement condemning the attack on cultural rights,
the murder of scholars, and the obstruction of education.11 However, CAFMENA was reluctant to take any steps even when clear evidence was presented. The reaction was disappointment on the part of hundreds of SAS members. This was happening at the same time that
MESA issued a statement condemning the Israeli aggression against Palestinians. Scholars of
Middle Eastern studies have failed to see the similarities between Palestinians and the
Armenians of Karabagh despite their analogous historical trajectories in the fight for the
right to self-determination.
The ambivalence of MESA’s leadership is testimony to a larger problem: the positioning of
Armenians in Middle Eastern studies and beyond. There still seems to be widespread ignorance of and indifference to all things Armenian. To understand this, we need to go back to
the first decades of MESA, when Armenians were not even a footnote in the pages of Middle
East history. For example, in the first decades of its inception MESA failed to address and
condemn the campaign of denial of the Armenian Genocide launched by consecutive
Turkish governments in the US academic sphere. This was a well-orchestrated campaign
9
Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Artsakh, “The Armenian Cultural Heritage in Artsakh
(Nagorno-Karabakh): Cases of Vandalism and at Risk of Destruction by Azerbaijan,” Ad Hoc Public Report,
Stepanakert, 26 January 2021, https://artsakhombuds.am/hy/document/792.
10
Hovannes Nazaretyan, “The Armenian Monuments are Targets for the Azerbaiani Soldiers,” (in Armenian), Fact
Investigation Platform, 25 January 2021, https://fip.am/14568.
11
On the correspondence between SAS and MESA, regarding the latter’s stance, see: Correspondence between the
Society for Armenian Studies and the Middle East Studies Association, 24 May 2021, 8 June 2021, and 23 June 2021,
https://societyforarmenianstudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/SAS-MESA-ARTSAKH.pdf.
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in which many prominent Middle Eastern and Ottoman/Turkish studies scholars took an
active role. For example, on May 19, 1985, sixty-nine prominent scholars of Turkish,
Ottoman, and Middle Eastern studies published an open letter in which they protested
US House Joint Resolution 192 that designated April 24, 1986 as a “National Day of
Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man” (especially for remembering the Armenian
Genocide by the government of the Ottoman Turkish Empire). They argued that a phrase
in the resolution that said “the one and one half million people of Armenian ancestry
who were victims of genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923” was misleading
or inaccurate.12 The letter continued to deny that a genocide had ever taken place in the
Ottoman Empire and denied that modern day Turkey had anything to do with it. But denialists of the Armenian Genocide are not part of the past, they are still very active in contemporary academic circles. In addition to being preoccupied with their futile efforts at the
dissemination of (mis)knowledge about the Armenian Genocide, they also are currently
embarking on new projects to write a revisionist history that denies the historical ties of
Armenians to the land of Karabagh and undermines their quest for self-determination.13
However, despite the continuing presence of denialists within the field of Middle Eastern,
Turkish, and Ottoman studies, in the past two decades there also have been positive steps
toward reckoning with the past, specifically among a younger generation of scholars.
Moreover, new waves of scholars are now interested in broader topics, like the political
and socioeconomic aspects of Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire.
It is important to note here that this marginalization is endemic to not only Armenians,
but encompasses other groups such as Copts, Assyrians, Maronites, and Chaldeans, among
others. It is time to start an honest and productive discussion about the position of these
minorities in the larger context of the field. Armenians as well as other minority groups
and their historical experiences in the region should not be viewed outside the prism of
Middle Eastern studies. On the contrary, all of these minorities possess a very rich and complex history. They are part and parcel of the political and socioeconomic transformations
that shaped the late 19th and the 20th centuries. Their diverse, untapped sources provide
an important medium for understanding the history of the region in all its complexities.

12

“Attention Members of the U.S. House of Representatives,” New York Times, 19 May 1985.
M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter, eds., The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Historical and Political Perspectives
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2022).
13
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